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In the criminal prosecution of Jason Milligan, the state court of Kansas was
confronted with the constitutionality and validity of a guilty plea obtained during a
judicially facilitated mediation.2 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques,
particularly mediation, have become increasingly popular tools in criminal pro-
ceedings and a number of jurisdictions are experimenting with their proper appli-
cation in criminal law. Although post-sentencing victim-offender mediation re-
mains the dominant method of mediation in the criminal context, case-
management mediation is slowly making its way into courtrooms across the na-
tion.' The decision by the Kansas court to uphold Jason Milligan's plea bargain,
despite his allegations of coercion, further strengthened the trend of mediation as
part of the plea-bargaining process.
The growing use of case-management mediation has prompted concerns over
the differences between, and applicability of, mediation in civil and criminal cas-
es. The increasing prevalence of judges acting as case-management mediator rais-
es questions regarding the coerciveness that a magistrate's presence may have on
the bargaining process. Jason Milligan's plea-bargaining experience, in which a
former trial judge served as mediator,4 highlights both the problems and potential
inherent in this new form of alternative dispute resolution.
This note first discusses the facts and proceedings in Milligan. Next, it ex-
plores the history and importance of plea-bargaining in the United States and how
mediation has slowly become a part of criminal proceedings. Next, this note ex-
amines the Milligan court's reasoning for upholding the mediation plea bargain at
issue in that case, in light of the legal landscape concerning ADR and the criminal
justice system. Finally, this note argues in favor of using case-management media-
tion in criminal plea negotiations, and explores the proper methods and procedures
to make these mediations successful.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 30, 2008 Jason Milligan ("Milligan") was charged by the State of
Kansas ("State") with rape, in violation of Kansas Statutory Authority 21-
1. No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Cri-
tique, 43 EMORY L. J. 1247, 1258 (1994); Mark S. Umbreit et al., The Impact of Victim-Offender
Mediation: Two Decades of Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 29 (stating that in 2001, there were
1300 VOM programs in almost 20 countries).
4. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942, at *3-4.
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3502(a)(1)(a). The State alleged that Randy Pickering ("Pickering") dropped
Milligan off at Milligan's younger sister's ("K.H.") home. 6 Milligan persuaded
K.H., who was pregnant, to go on a walk with him.7 During the walk, Milligan
told K.H. he wanted to feel the baby move and asked her to lie down on a table.8
When K.H. lay down, Milligan got on top of K.H., removed her pants, and forci-
bly penetrated her.9
In response to K.H.'s screams, two witnesses, William Brubaker ("Bru-
baker") and Andrew Shepherd ("Shepherd"), arrived at the scene and saw a man
on top of K.H.10 As Shepherd and Brubaker approached, the assailant jumped off
of K.H. and fled." Shepherd chased the assailant but was unable to catch him.12
Brubaker called 911 and K.H. began screaming that her brother had attempted to
rape her.13 K.H's screams were audible on the 911 recording of Brubaker's phone
call.14 When Pickering returned to pick Milligan up from K.H's home, Milligan
told him that, "if anyone asks, say I was with you all night," and that "my sister
may say something about me raping her."1  On August 16, 2011, Milligan was
arrested and placed in custody. 16
The State and Milligan agreed to have the case mediated by a mediator of the
presiding judge, Judge Wilson's, choosing." Judge Wilson selected retired judge
Thomas Conklin (Judge Conklin) as the mediator. During the mediation, Judge
Conklin communicated the strength of the State's case, telling Milligan that his
conviction was guaranteed.1 9 During an all-day mediation session on a Friday,
Milligan refused any offered plea deals and continually insisted on a trial, despite
facing a presumed jail sentence of 166-176-18620 months.21
The following Monday morning, prior to trial beginning, the State offered a
final plea deal, recommending a significant downward departure22 of 131 months
of incarceration.2 3 Milligan accepted the plea.24 At his plea hearing, Milligan
5. Id. at *1; Law of July 1, 2006, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 32-3592(a)(1)(A) (repealed by Laws 20,
Ch.136, § 307).
6. State v. Milligan, No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
7. Id.
8. Id.






15. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942, at *1.
16. Criminal History of Jason Lewis Milligan - Shawnee County, KS, JUST MUG SHOTS,
http://www.justmugshots.com/kansas/shawnee-county/16743425 (last visited Oct. 2, 2013.)
17. State v. Milligan, No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
18. Id.
19. Id. at *3.
20. The center number represents the presumptive number of months an offender should be sen-
tenced to prison. The other two numbers reflect a number of months the offender can be sentenced to
serve without the judge engaging in what is called "departure" sentencing. Sentencing Guidelines-
Sedgwick County District Attorney, http://www.sedgwickcounty.org/da/sentencing guidelines.asp (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
21. State v. Milligan, No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a downward departure as "a court's
imposition of a sentence more lenient that the standard guidelines propose, as when the court con-
cludes that a criminal's history is less serious than it appears.").
23. State v. Milligan, No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
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assented to the State's narrative of the facts,25 confirmed that he understood the
charges against him and his rights,26 and stipulated that he was not coerced or
threatened into taking the plea.27 Judge Wilson accepted Milligan's guilty plea.28
Before sentencing occurred, Milligan filed a motion to withdraw his plea.29
Milligan claimed that the mediator, Judge Conklin, coerced him into accepting the
plea agreement and that, due to the judicial participation in the mediation and plea
process, Milligan did not make his plea knowingly or intelligently.30 After an
evidentiary hearing, Judge Wilson denied Milligan's motion to withdraw his
plea. Judge Wilson held that Judge Conklin appropriately acted as a third party
mediator by strongly, but correctly, communicating the reality of the case to Mil-
ligan.32 Judge Wilson maintained that Milligan's initial resistance to a plea deal,
despite Judge Conklin's statements on Friday, coupled with his acceptance of a
more favorable plea deal the following Monday, was further evidence that no
coercion had occurred. Judge Wilson sentenced Milligan to 131 months of in-
carceration in accordance with the downward departure agreed to in the plea bar-
gain.34
Milligan appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, again
arguing that the mediation process facilitated by Judge Conklin, and Judge
Conklin's guarantee that Milligan would lose at trial, forced him to accept the
State's plea deal. Milligan's appeal specifically argued that Judge Conklin over-
stated the likelihood of the State's success, and that such a guarantee of defeat at
trial satisfied the standard of coercion necessary for Milligan's plea to be with-
drawn.36 The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected Milligan's coercion claims and
affirmed the district court's denial of Milligan's motion to withdraw. The Kansas
Court of Appeals held that the Shawnee District Court had not abused its discre-
tion, and that Milligan had failed to meet the standard of good cause required to
permit the withdrawal of Milligan's plea.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Plea-bargaining is the "process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a
criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval."3 8 Plea-bargaining "[u]sually involves the defendant pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to one or some of the counts of a multi-count indict-
24. Id. at *3.
25. Id. at *1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942, at *1.
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *2-*3.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id.
33. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942, at *3.
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id. at *3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Plea Bargaining - Criminal Law, USLEGAL, http://criminallaw.uslegal.com/plea-bargaining/
(last visited June 16, 2014).
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ment in return for a lighter sentence than the possibly graver charge."3 9 The plea-
bargaining process has become commonplace in criminal law.40 Today 90% of
federal and state court cases end with defendants entering a guilty plea.41 While
pre-trial adjudication has become common in the U.S legal system, plea agree-
ments in criminal cases require special scrutiny. When a defendant accepts a plea,
he waives important constitutional rights, such as the right to trial by jury, the
right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.42
Despite the important constitutional rights implicated in guilty pleas, U.S.
public policy continues to favor settlement over resorting to trial.43 Mediation is
an informal, non-adversarial ADR process whereby a neutral third party encour-
ages and facilitates the parties in voluntarily resolving their dispute." As ADR has
gained popularity in civil litigation, mediation of civil claims has become stand-
ard,45 and even required. Today, more than two-thirds of federal district courts
have mediation programs. 46 The growing cost of litigation and the increasingly
underfunded judiciary have contributed to the growth of plea-bargaining in the
criminal sector.47 In response to the demand for alternative dispute resolution,
states have begun to implement mediation in criminal plea negotiation.48
A. Criminal Plea-Bargaining: History ofFederal Law
By 1920 plea-bargaining was an integral part of the execution of criminal jus-
tice.49 In Brady v. United States,o the United States Supreme Court officially
legitimized plea-bargaining, and acknowledged that the nature of plea-bargaining
is itself coercive." In Brady, the Court held that plea-bargaining was presumptive-
ly constitutional as long as the defendant's guilty plea met three requirements.52
First, the plea must be entered voluntarily; second, the plea must be knowingly
committed to and the defendant must be aware of the consequences; and third, the
defendant must have assistance of counsel during the bargaining process.53 In
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990), available at
http://archive.org/stream/BlacksLaw6th/Blacks%o20Law%/206th djvu.txt.
40. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2005). State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons. Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs05.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
43. See generally Lindsey Devers, Ph.D., Bureau of Justice Assistance, Plea and Charge Bargaining
Research Summary (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf.
44. See Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (8th ed. 2004).
45. In many jurisdictions divorce mediation is mandatory. See, e.g., Dennis Saccuzzo, Controver-
sies in Divorce Mediation, 79 N.D. L. REV. 425, 430 (2003). In employment law, mediation is becom-
ing more commonplace due to mandatory mediation and arbitration clauses in contracts. See, e.g.,
Jason Schatz, Imposing Mandatory Mediation of Public Employment Disputes in New Jersey to Ame-
liorate an Impending Fiscal Crisis, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2005).
46. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of "Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004).
47. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
48. See generally State v. Milligan No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
See also Jack Hanna, Mediation in Criminal Matters, 15 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4 (2008).
49. Douglas D. Guidorizzing, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of
Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 765 (1998).
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addressing each factor, the majority opinion noted that voluntariness would need
to be established on a case-by-case basis, in light of the circumstances unique to
each case.54
The Court recognized that, "[t]he state to some degree encourages pleas of
guilty at every important step in the criminal process."5 5 The Court, in Brady, also
established the standard that defendant must meet in order to withdraw a guilty
plea. The Court explained that, unless a defendant enters a plea as a result of actu-
al or threatened physical harm or mental coercion resulting in the loss of free will,
plea-bargaining will not be considered coerced or involuntary, and a guilty plea
will be upheld.5 6 Despite the pressures faced by the defendant during the plea-
bargaining process, the Court declined to hold guilty pleas invalid under the Fifth
Amendment.5 ' Although the Court acknowledged that defendants may be moti-
vated by the likelihood of a lesser sentence in response to a plea of guilt versus a
trial in which punishment is uncertain, they stipulated that any such incentive does
not amount to the level of coercion required to invalidate a guilty plea.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed both the constitutionality of plea-bargaining
and their support of it, in Santobello v. New York. 5 9 The Santobello decision rec-
ognized plea-bargaining as critical to the American system of criminal law, stating
that the process was "an essential component of the administration of justice." 60
The Court provided further protection for defendants in instances where prosecu-
torial promises are not kept, ruling that the state's plea-bargaining guarantees to a
defendant must be honored.61 Furthermore, Santobello acknowledged that the
judicial system relies on plea-bargaining, because "if every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial the States and Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities," in order to
meet the need.62 Finally, in Santobello, the Court ruled that a defendant has nei-
ther a right to be offered a plea deal, nor a guarantee that a judge will accept a
plea. 63
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,64 the Court recognized that the state's goal in ob-
taining a plea deal is to persuade a defendant to admonish the right to plead not
guilty and forgo trial.65 The Bordenkircher Court further explained that, although
threatening a defendant with more serious charges at trial may be discouraging;
the decisions faced by a defendant are a permissible part of a system that encour-
ages negotiation prior to trial. 66 In Hill v. Lockhart,67 the Court established that
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiation are ana-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
60. Id at 260.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id at 262.
64. 434 U.S. 357 (1968).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
No. 1] 165
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lyzed using the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.68 In a subse-
quent decision, the Court explained that the Strickland holding applies to plea
bargains, because "the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."69
In recent years, the Court has continued to hear cases involving plea deals. In
Missouri v. Frye,70 the court held that in the instance that a plea deal is offered by
the prosecution, defendants have a constitutional right to be presented with plea
offers made. In Lafler v. Cooper,72 the Court ruled that the Strickland Test ap-
plies to cases in which a defendant rejects a plea offer on the advice of counsel
and is later convicted at trial. The Court noted that, in a situation where the de-
fendant rejects an offer, the injury is not remedied by specific performance of the
original plea offered by the prosecution prior to trial.7 4
B. Plea Withdrawal in Kansas
In Milligan, the Kansas Court of Appeals noted the history of Kansas state
case and statutory law impacting Milligan's motion to withdraw his plea. 5 Kansas
Statute 22-3210 provides the guidelines for accepting and withdrawing guilty
76
pleas and pleas of nolo contedere in Kansas state courts. Despite the similarities
to its federal counterpart, the pertinent part of the statute provides that in order to
withdraw a plea prior to sentencing, a defendant must show good cause.78 To
withdraw a plea following sentencing a defendant must show manifest injustice.79
In State v. Edgar,so the Kansas Supreme Court enumerated a list of considera-
tions for decisions involving review of plea withdrawal." In State v. Green,8 the
Kansas Supreme Court cited the Edgar Factors, holding that, when deciding a
post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea, a district court should consider: "(1)
whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the
defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3)
whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made." 3 The Green court noted
68. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To obtain relief for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel the defendant must show that the counsel's performance was deficient, such that
counsel's errors were "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and, this deficient performance must be so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
69. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
70. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
71. Id.
72. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
73. Id. at 1390.
74. Id. at 1391.
75. State v. Milligan, No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
76. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3210(d)(1) (2012).
77. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
78. State v. Morris, 283 Kan. 531, 545 (Kan. 2007).
79. Id. A plea of guilty or nolo contedere, for good cause shown and within the discretion of the
court, may be withdrawn at anytime before sentence is adjudged. To correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the
plea." Id.
80. 127 P.3d 986 (Kan. 2006).
81. Id. at 989.
82. 153 P.3d 1216 (2007).
83. Id. at 1225.
[Vol. 2014166
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that the Edgar Factors are benchmarks, and that the district court must consider
the relevant circumstances of every case independently.8 4 Additionally, the court
stipulated that, in Kansas, good cause does not require the defendant to prove that
his constitutional rights have been violated."
C. Mediation and the Criminal Law
Mediation has been recognized as a tool of criminal law since the 1970's, and
86today there are over 300 programs integrating mediation and criminal justice.
Two forms of criminal mediation exist, Victim Offender Mediation Programs
(VOM), and case-management mediation. The majority of mediation programs
used in the criminal justice system are VOMs.8 7 In VOM programs, the victim and
offender meet under the guidance of a mediator and discuss the crime and its im-
pacts.88 The second form of criminal mediation, case-management mediation,
focuses on ending lawsuits and providing additional options to avoid trial.89
VOM programs take a restorative justice approach to the law, in contrast to
traditional criminal law, which is dominated by a retributive justice approach.90
Retributivists seek to decide "what law was broken, determine who broke the law,
and provide a punishment to the perpetrator." 91 Conversely, the goal of restorative
justice is to repair the damage sustained by the victim or community, at the hands
of the perpetrator.92 VOM programs emphasize offering the victim and the perpe-
trator a chance to meet in a controlled environment to "share the pain of being
victimized and answer questions about how and why."93
The appropriateness of VOM depends on the crime. Most states with VOM
programs require that a perpetrator plead or admit guilt prior to participation in the
mediation.94 The fact that VOM takes place following adjudication, and the penal-
ty phase of the criminal process, is an interesting distinction from civil mediation,
in which the focus is on settlement for the parties.95 Additionally, unlike plea ne-
84. State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512 (Kan. 2009) (citing to State v. Green, 283 Kan. 530, 546
(Kan. 2007)).
8 5. Id.
86. Mark S Umbreit, Robert Coates, & Betty Vos, Victim Offender Mediation: Three Decades of
Practice and Research, 222 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 279-81 (2004).
87. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Cri-
tique, 43 EMORY L. J. 1247, 1280-81 (1994).
88. See Umbreit, Coates & Vos, supra note 86.
89. Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571,
573 (2004).
90. See Marty Price, Crime and Punishment: Can Mediation Produce Restorative Justice for Victims
and Offenders?, VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAM INFO. & RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.vorp.com/articles/crime.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014); see also Katherine L. Joseph,
Victim-Offender Mediation: What Social and Political Factors Will Affect its Development?, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 207 (1996).
9 1. Id.
92. Id.
93. Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates, & Betty Vos, The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation:
Two Decades ofResearch, 65 FED. PROBATION 29,30 (2001).
94. Mark S. Umbreit & Jean Greenwood, National Survey of Victim-Offender Mediation Programs
in the United States, 16 MEDIATION Q. 235, 250 (1999) (writing on the number of victim-offender
mediation programs that exist in the United States).
95. Mark S. Umbreit, Robert Coates, & Betty Vos, Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of
Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 270-81 (2004).
No. 1] 167
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gotiations or trial, in VOM, offenders' attorneys are rarely present or invited to the
mediation.96 VOM provides many victims with a chance to discuss the impact
that the offender's actions had on their life. 97 For victims, VOM can be an im-
portant therapeutic tool, a chance to ask an offender questions about the incident,
and hopefully obtain closure. 98
An alternative to VOM, and the criminal mediation method at issue in Milli-
gan, is known as Voluntary Settlement Conferencing or case-management media-
tion. Unlike VOM's relationship-centered focus, case-management mediation is
motivated by a need to conserve limited governments funds, by cutting court
dockets and increasing the likelihood of pre-trial plea bargains. 99 In case-
management mediation, the prosecutor, defendant, defendant's counsel, and a
mediator are all present throughout negotiations. 00 Advocates of case-
management mediation urge that the presence of a neutral third party during plea
negotiations limits the potential for abuse in plea-bargaining.101 Despite the lack
of data on the topic, it appears that third party judges serve as the mediators in
most case-management mediations, which has led to concerns about judicial coer-
cion and undue influence. 102
In the face of the established method of plea-bargaining, mediation is gaining
increased popularity in criminal proceedings. VOM and case-management media-
tion allows courts to take two different approaches to facilitate pre-trial adjudica-
tions and post-trial proceedings, depending on the desired outcome given the facts
and circumstances of each case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State v. Milligan, the Kansas Court of Appeals ("court") rejected Milli-
gan's claim that a coercive atmosphere forced him to accept the plea deal offered
to him by the state, and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Milligan's motion to withdraw the plea. 103 The court first outlined the
good cause standard used to consider a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea,
prior to sentencing. 104 The court explained that district courts must consider the
Edgar Factors to determine whether a defendant has established good cause for
overturning his guilty plea.105
96. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Cri-
tique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1280-81 (1994).
97. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION INANUTSHELL 282, 284 (2003).
98. Id. at 283.
99. See Thomas H. Oehmke, Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse: A Litigator's Roadmap, 86
AM. JUR TRIALS 111, § 2 (2003).




103. No. 108,094, 2013 WL 2919942 (Kan. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).
104. Id. "Prior to Sentencing a district court may, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, with-
draw a defendants plea of guilty or nolo condere for 'good cause shown."' Id. (citing K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 22-3210(d)(1)).
105. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942, at *2 (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 (2006); K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 22-3210(d)(1)). The Edgar Factors are: "(1) whether the defendant was represented by compe-
tent counsel, (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage
of, and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandably made." Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36.
[Vol. 2014168
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The court next explained that the standard of review on an appeal when as-
sessing a trial court's refusal of a motion to withdraw a plea requires that a "de-
fendant sufficiently demonstrate that the district court abused its sound discre-
tion," in its refusal to withdraw the plea.1 06 The court further explained that in
order for a judicial action to be considered an abuse of discretion, the judicial
action must be arbitrary or unreasonable and based on either an error of law, due
to an inaccurate legal conclusion, or an error of fact, where there is insubstantial
evidence supporting a finding of fact by the court.107
The court began by analyzing Milligan's claim that the alleged coercive con-
ditions of the plea-bargaining satisfied the good cause shown standard.108 The
court first noted that Judge Conklin was not referred to the case for mediation
until both parties had agreed to participate in mediation, in an effort to avoid tri-
al.1 09 The court further noted that the conditions surrounding Milligan's mediation
session were not coercive, as a lunch break was provided, in addition to water and
restroom breaks.11" The court stressed that despite the lack of physical coercion, as
a defendant facing an imminent trial for rape, Milligan faced mounting pressure to
accept a plea deal."' Despite these facts, the court found that the pressure that
Milligan faced was no more than that faced by any other defendant in a similar
position.11
Next, the court considered Milligan's argument that Judge Conklin's state-
ment guaranteeing a verdict for the State was coercive. The court agreed that the
Conklin's guarantee of conviction at trial was a strong statement." Despite the
severity of Judge Conklin's statement, the court explained that Judge Conklin was
simply fulfilling his duty as a mediator, communicating the strength of the state's
case to Milligan and informing him of the "harsh reality that the outcome of a jury
trial is determined by what the jury believe the facts to be."1 14 The court explained
that the mediation process allowed Milligan to understand the reality and uncer-
tainty of a jury trial when determining whether or not to plead guilty. 1"
In the second portion of its decision, the court evaluated whether the coercion
that Milligan allegedly faced during the plea negotiation was sufficient to prevent
him from exercising his free will, preventing him from freely pleading guilty. 116
The court emphasized the fact that Judge Wilson presided over both the plea hear-
ing, and the motion to withdraw the plea, which the court found substantially
weakened Milligan's claim of coercion. 17 The court also found that Milligan's
claims of coercion and undue influence were undermined by the fact that he ac-
106. Id. (citing State v. Macias-Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836 (2012)).
107. Id. (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). "(1) is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by
the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal
conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence doesn't support a
factual finding on which prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based." Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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cepted a better plea offer a few days after he rejected the State's initial plea of-
fer. 1 In rejecting Milligan's argument that the conditions of negotiation were so
coercive that his free will was overborne, the court held that the Shawnee District
Court was best suited to decide whether Milligan knowingly and intelligently pled
guilty.119
Upon denying the second prong of Milligan's argument, the court affirmed
the district court's ruling, and denied Milligan's motion to withdraw his plea.120
As a result of the court's holding, Milligan will serve his sentence according to the
sentencing provision of the plea agreement.
V. COMMENT
Milligan's claims raise important concerns regarding the implementation of
mediation in the criminal law context. This section examines the concerns regard-
ing the use of mediation as a tool to avoid criminal trials, and will explain how
mediation can actually serve to decrease the coercive nature of the plea-bargaining
process.
A. Current Mediation Concerns
Understanding why the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the plea agreement
in Milligan reveals some of the positive and negative aspects of case-management
mediation, as well as the impact that mediator-selection has on these negotiations.
This section explores concerns about case-management mediation in criminal
cases, and suggests safeguards that courts can adopt to protect defendants' rights
and ensure fairness during plea-bargaining.
In traditional plea-bargaining, prosecutors are the dominant party, determin-
ing when charges will be filed and against whom, and whether to offer a plea deal
to the defendant.121 Additionally, prosecutors normally have discretion to offer
defendants pleas agreements with lower sentences, or to threaten those defendants
that are unwilling to take the negotiated deal with harsher punishment.122 Due to
the fact that most judges accept the state's sentencing recommendations, the pros-
ecutor often dictates the penalty a defendant receives.12 Due to prosecutors' pow-
er over plea negotiations, there is little incentive to engage in fair bargaining, and
even less incentive for defendants to take their chances at trial in which defend-
ants risk the possibility of an unfavorable verdict resulting in an almost guaranteed
increase in sentence severity.14 The prosecutorial dominance found in plea nego-
tiations prevents plea-bargaining from being a method of alternative dispute reso-




121. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1477
(1993).
122. Rodney Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systematic Approach,
2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 88 (1995).
123. Id. at 89.
124. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45 (1983).
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Rather, plea-bargaining is a process in which the prosecutor takes on the role of
attorney, judiciary, and fact finder, forcing the defendant into a proverbial corner
where the only escape is a trial.125
Although the prosecutor holds much of the power in plea-bargaining, the
judge hearing the case also plays an important role. Despite the judge's role as
unbiased guarantor of fair procedure,12 6 a judge's previous decisions as to trial
date, scheduling, bail, and sentencing also greatly influence the defendant's deci-
sion whether to pursue a plea deal.127 The defendant's fears of coercion can be
exacerbated when a judge or former judge serves as the mediator in a plea nego-
tiation. Just as in the court room, third party mediators that have worked as judges
may feel compelled to help clear the docket, or entice a particular defendant into
the government's offered deal.128 Normally, a judge is prohibited from telling a
defendant that they will likely be given a harsher sentence if they go to trial be-
cause of the coercive nature of such a statement. 129 However, in a plea negotiation
mediation, where a judge-mediator communicates the strengths and weaknesses of
a case to both parties, this is not the rule. In Milligan's case, this behavior was
found to be completely acceptable.130 While scholars and legislatures have ex-
pressed concerns about the coercive nature of judges mediating negotiations, the
more pressing issue in criminal plea bargain negotiations is ensuring that the de-
fendant's due process rights are not violated. "' Once the judge, a neutral third
party, is removed from the process, and negotiations commence behind close
doors, prosecutorial power becomes infinite. 13 2
B. Mediation's Positive Impact on Plea-Bargaining
Contrary to Milligan's allegations that the presence of a judge as mediator
caused his plea-bargaining negotiation to be coercive, in most situations the pres-
ence of a neutral mediator can mitigate some of the coercive effects of the plea-
bargaining process. Prosecutors with unlimited power to make plea deals are able
to strike unfair bargains, and in some cases, cause innocent people to enter guilty
pleas. 3 By adding a neutral party to negotiations that are typically between only
the prosecutor and defense attorney, defendants' due process rights may be af-
forded additional protections, similar to those offered by a judge in a courtroom.
The presence of a neutral mediator can ensure that a prosecutor will not overstep
his authority or employ unconscionable negotiation techniques.
125. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretions, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 25 (1998).
126. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and the Convicting the Innocent:
The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 233 (2002).
127. Uphoff, supra note 122, at 89.
128. Maureen E Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571,
614 (2004).
129. Uphoff, supra note 122, at n.56 (citing United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1134-35 (11th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d
552, 555-58 (9th Cir. 1992)).
130. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942.
131. Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 126; Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Crim-
inal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571, 614 (2004).
132. Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 126.
133. George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road For Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and
Future ofRules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2000).
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A mediator's presence also allows for better communication between the par-
ties. Additionally, a neutral third party mediator provides both parties with an
objective view of the strengths and weaknesses of their case.13 4 The reduction of
prosecutorial power, and the distribution of control over communication to all
parties involved, is likely to result in fairer agreements and further protection of
defendants' constitutional rights. Additionally, the presence of a third party may
help settle cases that should not proceed to trial, as defendants are given the op-
portunity to hear from a neutral party whether their case is weak or has a low
chance of success at trial.
In Milligan, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea based on the presence
of a former judge during the negotiations, and the judge's comments during the
negotiation.' Although there has been concern about involving judges in media-
tion, advocates of the process argue that if judicial mediators are properly trained,
just as non-judicial mediators are, they will be cognizant of the great power they
have over the situation and the parties, and be able to avoid coercive conduct.1 6
Criminal mediation can be demanding, and both parties expect the mediator to
execute sometimes-conflicting tasks in a high pressure, high stakes setting. The
judge's traditional role in the courtroom has caused some to be concerned that
they are inherently coercive mediators,3 but if properly trained, a judge-
moderator's judicial experience and training can aid both parties, ensuring greater
protection of rights and providing a watchful eye over negotiations.
The criminal justice system in the U.S. is undergoing a necessary moderniza-
tion, developing alternative dispute resolution programs, and adopting case-
management mediation in criminal cases. The Milligan13 8 court correctly held that
the judge-mediator and the plea agreement at issue were not in violation of Milli-
gan's constitutional rights, clearing the way for Kansas to continue to use media-
tion to ensure both fair negotiating and fair sentencing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system in the United States could not function without
the use of plea-bargaining. The current trend of including mediation and alterna-
tive dispute resolution techniques in the plea-bargaining process provides another
opportunity for criminal cases to be resolved, prior to trial. Despite the benefits,
this tool should not be employed without safeguards to protect defendants' consti-
tutional rights. The power of prosecutors and judges in plea-bargaining, and de-
fendants' lack of control over their own fate during negotiations, is the perfect
opportunity for alternative dispute resolution's influence. Although, there remain
unanswered questions about mediation's successful use in the criminal sector, an
argument can be made that mediation will significantly lower the coercive pres-
sures felt by defendants. Despite further concerns about judicial presence in case-
management mediation, the benefits of neutral third party involvement far out-
weigh the dangers, and if properly employed, can have extremely positive out-
comes. Plea mediation allows an opportunity to remedy some of the coercive ef-
134. Doug Marfice, The MischiefofCourt Ordered Mediation, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2002).
135. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942.
136. Laflin, supra note 131, at 621.
137. Id. at 607.
138. Milligan, 2013 WL 2919942.
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